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Abstract 
Coordination at the national level is an essential part of the EU policy process. This article analyses 
the effects of EU pre-accession programmes on the development of national-level structures for the 
coordination of EU funds in Croatia. The article is based on an in-depth case study of the Croatian 
coordination structures for EU funding, using a three-step analytical framework of adaptation. The 
empirical research focuses on the role and influence of the Croatian Central State Office for 
Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds (CODEF). The main finding was that pre-
accession assistance played a decisive role in the establishment and early support of national 
coordination structures. However, holistic reform in the state sector was not achieved and the new 
institutions were often challenged by domestic opposition structures. The research provides useful 
insights for the literature on Europeanization in accession countries, and for EU pre-accession policy.  
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Over the past decade, the study of European governance has increasingly recognised the importance 
of institutional coordination. Partly, this reflects ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽŐĂŝŶĂďĞƚƚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ  “ǁŚĂƚ
governance implies for managing the relations within and between different national and European 
ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?^ĐŚŽƵƚĂŶĚ:ŽƌĚĂŶ ? ? ? ?: 202) and the coherence of policymaking and delivery (Christiansen 
2001) as well as assessing whether and how the EU is achieving its goal of greater policy 
effectiveness through improved institutional coordination. The coordination of EU policymaking at 
the national level has been a particular focus of concern in studies of the most recent EU 
enlargements, with the conditionalities of accession requiring extensive reform of political and 
administrative structures, including institutional and policy coherence (Kassim et al 2000; Kassim 
2003; Sedelmeier 2006). Coordination capability is regarded as one four key essential requirements 
for effective administrative capacity (Hertie School of Governance 2013). The accession countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe have faced the challenge of establishing the necessary coordination 
structures prior to their accession, which in many cases involved a paradigm shift from a 
hierarchical, legalistic and centralised yet ineffective planning to more inclusive, accountable and 
network modes of coordination  W albeit with very different outcomes in terms of the structures, 
functioning and effectiveness of national coordination systems (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007; 
Gärtner et al. 2011). Similar challenges apply to candidate countries in South-East Europe (SEE). EU 
pre-accession assistance programmes including the current Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
(IPA) have sought to aid national administrations in establishing structures for national coordination 
of EU policies. 
In this context, the following article explores the national coordination of EU policies in Croatia. 
Specifically, it investigates how EU pre-accession financial aid influenced the development of 
national structures for the coordination of EU funds. This was particularly challenging for Croatia 
given that the aid was expected to support the structural changes needed for the future 
implementation of EU Cohesion policy, which cuts across a wide range of policy areas 
(infrastructure, business development, employment and training, R&D, environment etc) and 
requires both horizontal coordination across different government ministries and agencies as well as 
vertical coordination between national and sub-national actors. This type of policy was new for 
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Croatia, and the preparation for EU accession also involved a domestic process for establishing a 
regional policy  ?ƵůĂďŝđ ĂŶĚ DĂŶŽũůŽǀŝđ  ? ? ? ? ?. The research found that, while pre-accession had 
partial success in establishing the required coordination structures, the regulatory conditionalities 
and EU support were insufficient to overcome the deficiencies in administrative capacity, the effects 
of political and institutional stability, and the inability or unwillingness of the national coordination 
structures to manage effective coordination among national and sub-national actors.  
This paper is based on research on the effects of EU pre-accession financial aid to Croatia (from 2008 
to 2012) on the development of national-level structures for the coordination of EU funds 
(Antonopoulos 2013). The article begins by outlining a conceptualisation framework for analysing 
the adaptation of coordination structures at the national level, drawing on the literature, and setting 
out the methodological approach to the Croatian case. Second, it applies the analytical approach 
through empirical research focusing in particular on the institutional remit and the challenges faced 
by the main coordinating organisation for EU funding in Croatia, the Central State Office for 
Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds (CODEF). Third, the paper draws conclusions on 
the effectiveness of pre-accession aid in supporting national-level coordination and makes policy 
recommendations for enhancing the EU and domestic level exegesis of adaption in coordination 
structures. 
 
CONCEPTUALISING THE ADAPTATION OF COORDINATION STRUCTURES 
The coordination requirements for EU Cohesion policy typify the forceful dynamics of institutional 
and administrative change involved in preparing for accession. The establishment and evolution of 
coordinating institutions reflect both normative and regulatory stipulations emanating from the EU, 
as well as constituting milestones in the paths of domestic adaptation. Inter-ministerial coordination 
is a key measure of effective implementation of EU assistance given the multitude of actors involved 
in the planning, management and implementation process whose priorities and administrative 
procedures need to be aligned. An inadequate record of coordination is an inhibiting factor for 
institutional change at least in part (see Pierson 2004); conversely coordination achieved through 
pre-accession instruments is a facilitating factor for the effective use of Structural and Cohesion 
(now Investment) Funds after accession.  
Normatively charged concepts employed in discussion of pre-accession processes, such as 
administrative capacity, are only slowly being operationalised in theoretical accounts. Invoking 
concepts is a key part of the negotiation process and an aspect of the cultural interface between EU 
and domestic negotiators. Parties give substance to concepts by offering rewards, threatening 
sanctions or stressing constraints. A significant part of the Enlargement literature provides abstract 
theorising by stressing the role of misfit of EU and domestic models. Other scholars substantiate 
assertions with explanations of the prescribed models and the initial conditions in situ either in pre-
accession contexts or ENP and third countries Europeanization (Chandler 2006; Holden 2009; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Zielonka 2007). Financial assistance has often not been a field 
of investigation per se, but treated as a concomitant part of Enlargement policy (Dimitrova 2002; 
Grabbe 2006; Niemann 2006; Vachudova 2005) with the exception of some accounts from outside 
the Europeanization literature (e.g. Bailey and De Propris 2004; Tulmets 2005) and other occasional 
contributions on institution-building issues (Bechev and Andreev 2005). 
Conceptualisations of Europeanization as the evolution of domestic institutions in response to EU 
pressures constitute the theoretical basis of inquiry. Europeanization is understood ĂƐ  ‘the 
reorientation or reshaping of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect policies, practices or 
ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ h ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?(Bache 2008: 2). Europeanization is 
further interpreted as P  ‘Processes of [...] construction, diffusion, and institutionalisation of formal 
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and informal rules, prŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ?ƐƚǇůĞƐ ? “ǁĂǇƐŽĨĚŽŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŚĂƌĞĚďĞůŝĞĨƐ
and norms which are [...] incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?(Radaelli 2003: 30). The approach proposed here is a heuristic hybrid 
between the standard model of Europeanization (Green Cowles et al 2001) ĂŶĚ <Ŷŝůů ?Ɛ ƚŚƌĞĞ-step 
model of administrative Europeanization (Knill 2001). In the standard model, EU pressure, mediated 
by intervening variables, leads to reactions and change at the domestic level including resistance and 
inertial responses (Radaelli and Pasquier 2008). European politics and institutions are an 
independent variable and the pressure created by Europeanization is a function of the degree of fit 
(misfit) or congruence between  ‘Europe ? and the domestic level (Caporaso 2008). Thus, pressures to 
adjust and goodness of fit, mediated by domestic-level factors, produce certain outcomes. The first 
stage of the model corresponds to European integration, the second stage to fit or misfit, and the 
ƚŚŝƌĚƐƚĂŐĞƚŽŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?<Ŷŝůů ?ƐŵŽĚĞůƌƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨ
the compatibility of national and European policies as a first step for the complete examination of 
adaptation pressures, but stresses that  ‘goodness of fit ? is an ŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƐĐŽƉĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞhůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ(Knill 2001: 43).  
The question for this study is how the multi-level and compound EU political system (Hix 2005) 
interacts with the simple and unitary Croatian polity (Bache et al 2010). The two models interact in 
the policy area of pre-accession assistance, the independent variable for the research. The 
dependent variable are the  “ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?that originate as a result of pre-accession aid influence. 
Structures refer to the purpose-built institutions either for policy-implementation in a sector of the 
acquis, or the management and implementation of pre-accession assistance. The establishment of 
public agencies and semi-autonomous organisations to carry out public services is considered a 
change in government structure (Ongaro 2009: 3).  
Contractually required institution-building interventions as a result of pre-accession aid (including 
Technical Assistance and Twinning) reveal the goodness of fit of the EU model (see Grabbe 2006). 
This is most directly exposed by the success or failure of an accession country in meeting the 
accreditation criteria for pre-accession assistance structures (EC 718/2007 Art. 11), which is 
undoubtedly an explicit part of the acquis ĂŶĚ Ă ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ  “ŚĂƌĚ ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ?(see Grabbe 2006: 60)  W 
arguably contradicting the predominant view of Chapter 22 (Regional policy and coordination of 
structural instruments) ĂƐ  “ƚŚŝŶ ?(Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2005: 73). Fit/misfit is also revealed 
through such measures as the record in managing, implementing and spending funds. Pre-accession 
instruments incorporate a range of channels for EU assessment in the form of benchmarking, 
monitoring, reporting and evaluation (Grabbe 2006: 83). Further, socialization fora established via 
pre-accession aid (comprising committees
1
, events, meetings, regular personal and impersonal 
communication) provide EU fields to exert influence on local mediating factors.  
The sum of the above comprise the adaptation pressures generated through the EU funding 
instruments. These pressures can be assigned values of weak or strong, although in practice there 
will be a spectrum of influence.  ‘tĞĂŬ ?ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐ can be characterised as a mix of conditionality and 
communication that are insufficient or only partially effective in influencing opposition structures  W 
such as overcoming inertia, political or administrative resistance, capacity deficits etc.  ‘^ƚƌŽŶŐ ?
adaptation pressures comprise a credible mix of conditionality (rewards such as financial transfers, 
conferral of delegated EU funding management responsibilities) or sanctions (suspension of funding, 
limited access to components, programme and project conditionalities) and effective 
communication which is capable of overcoming domestic opposition. Three end results are: 
structural change; stagnation; or retreat. This is of course a simplified concept, and the literature 
offers a fuller range of intermediate configurations of change (Ongaro 2009; Radaelli 2003; Streeck 
and Thelen 2005). Finally, adaptation pressure feeds back into the domestic model as demands for 
structural change, and into pre-accession aid as demands for changes to intervention priorities 
according to the situation on the ground.  
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Operationalising the above through an analytical framework for the Croatian case, the present study 
takes a simplified but theoretically grounded three-step approach to investigating the domestic 
reaction to EU pressures. The analytical steps address in turn: 
(i) the ex ante situation  W which involves varied levels of (in)compatibility between the 
management model for national resources and institutional functions required for the 
management of EU Funds;  
(ii) EU institutional influence  W involving new institutions established outside the core 
executive, and the requirement for new administrative systems, procedures or other 
ways of working; and  
(iii) domestic reaction  W which, depending on the power of influence and control of the new 
institutions over national policymaking, may lead to compliance or resistance by the 
national elites. 
 
Institutional compatibility 
As discussed above, it is the institutional compatibility between EU policies and national 
administrative arrangements that defines the domestic impact of EU policies (Knill 2001). Crucially, 
ĂŶ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ  “ĐŽƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐements are, constitutes a major 
element of the examination of the degree of adaptation pressure. The empirical discussion of this 
step builds on research focusing on the structural characteristics of national systems of governance 
and the role they play in facilitating/obstructing change. The distinction between simple and 
compound polities is employed in this regard (Schmidt 2006 in Bache et al. 2010). The assumption is 
that unitary states with disorganised systems of representation find it harder to adapt to EU policies. 
Similar case studies have been carried out in South-East Europe: Greece is a simple polity with 
disorganised interests (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). Croatia is also characterised as a 
simple polity with a majoritarian representation, which adds to the rationale for the above 
assumption (Bache et al. 2010). An outline of the required coordinating structures in the IPA 
regulations is provided together with a discussion of the domestic processes taking place which may 
be incompatible with the EU model.  
 
EU influence 
This step develops the existing literature on multi-level governance and the spread of agencies in the 
EU. It examines the likelihood that institutions established for the purpose of managing the EU 
Funds in Croatia follow the Type II multi-level governance logic (Marks and Hooghe 2004), which 
refers to institutions of specific purpose, with more limited duration, extrinsic, fluctuating and 
intersecting membership and competing jurisdictions (Frey and Eichenberger 1999). Furthermore, 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ŽĨ ƐƵĐŚ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ĂƐ Ă ƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  “ĚŽƵďůĞ-ŚĂƚƚĞĚ ?
national regulatory agencies serving both national ministerial departments and the Commission 
(Egeberg and Trondal 2009: 779). Similarly, institutional mechanisms of change have been given 
ŵĂŶǇ ůĂďĞůƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ůĂǇĞƌŝŶŐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ŶĞǁ ƉŽůŝĐǇ Žƌ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ
without eliminating the old ? (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 170). Other forms are: conversion (formal 
reform, replacement or elimination of an existing policy or institution); diffusion (Parrado-Diez 
2008); displacement (discovering and activating alternative institutional forms that existed before); 
drift (gradual and sometimes unplanned adaptation of institutions); and exhaustion (the institution 
gradually loses its purpose and, though formally still in place, it ultimately breaks down).  
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The literature provides answers on how organisational autonomy can be operationalised. Morten 
Egeberg and Jarle Trondal (2010) take the frequency of contact between institutions as a potential 
indicator of agency autonomy, agency influence and inter-institutional coordination: less contact 
equates to more autonomy, less agency influence and less inter-institutional coordination. 
Conversely, they expect that greater contact involves less agency autonomy, more agency influence 
and more inter-institutional coordination (Egeberg and Trondal 2010). Furthermore, when 
measuring agency autonomy, they take into account the perceived importance of various actors 
when important decisions are made within their issue area, the extent to which steering signals from 
other actors are emphasised, and the extent to which agency personnel identify themselves with the 
central administration as a whole: the more they identify with the executive, the less independent 
the agency should be. Agency influence is defined as the extent to which agencies succeed in getting 
their argument across. Lastly, the authors measure inter-institutional coordination through the 
perceptions of how good the ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨŵƵƚƵĂůƚƌƵƐƚ ? ?
 
Domestic reaction 
The third issue is the influence and control of the new institutions on national policy. In the EU10, 
the picture was mixed. On one hand, PHARE/twinning influences were characterised as bringing 
ĂďŽƵƚ  “ŝĚĞĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐƌŽƐƐ-ĨĞƌƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ŚǇďƌŝĚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽůĚ
legacies and EU influence (Tulmets 2005: 83) ? KŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ  “ŝƐůĂŶĚƐ ŽĨ ĞǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞ ? ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ
through the specific focus of administrative-capacity programmes on liaison offices in the national 
administration, could even have detrimental effects on the capacity of the administration as a 
whole, by diverting funding from other departments (Goetz 2001: 1043). In fact, few of the EU10 
expanded best practice approaches from pre-accession to the public management systems at large 
(Verheijen 2007). However, recent studies found positive results with respect to the implementation 
record in the 2004-06 period (for the 2004 accession countries)  but with questions about the 
durability of administrative capacity and implementation performance in 2007-13 (Bachtler et al, 
2013). 
In assessing domestic reaction, attention needs to be paid to the role of domestic political elites, as a 
mediating factor for institutional revision. As Eriksen (2007: 335-339) ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ‘ĞǀĞŶŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
systems with noticeably asymmetric power relations, seemingly weak domestic actors will have 
opportuniƚŝĞƐƚŽŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?,ƵŐŚĞƐet al. (2005) found that the actual 
policy and institutional outcomes in the Central and East European Countries  were influenced by 
resilient domestic institutions that resisted conditionality, instrumentalised it, and preferred 
ĞŶĚŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ŽǀĞƌ h ŵŽĚĞůƐ ? ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ  ‘ŝĨ ƚŚĞ
government is an anti-reform coalition then effects of aid agency are compromised unless clear 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐĞƚ ?(Bartlett 2008: 170).  
Apart from obstructionist national elites, domestic cultural factors may partly explain incomplete or 
ŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?/ŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚƌƵůĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
affective aspects of membership in an organisation, and the means whereby they are shaped and 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?(Alvesson 2002: 3) ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĂŶĂŐĞŶĐǇ
ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŐŽ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƚĂƐŬƐ ?(Thoenig 2007: 
90). The literĂƚƵƌĞƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĂƚƉƵďůŝĐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶĂŐƌĂĚƵĂůǁĂǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŚĞŶƐŽŵĞƌƵůĞƐ
or procedures are sanctified, when some members or units of the public agency become semi-
autonomous centres of power, and develop their own vested interests, when administrative 
ƐǇŵďŽůƐ ?ƌŝƚƵĂůƐĂŶĚŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐĞǆŝƐƚ ?ƚŚŝĐŬŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƌŽŽƚ ? (Thoenig 2007: 90). 
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INVESTIGATING THE INFLUENCE OF PRE-ACCESSION ON COORDINATION IN CROATIA 
The above analytical approach was applied to the case study of Croatia in research undertaken over 
the 2008-12 period, a critical period for institutional adaptation in the lead up to accession in 2013. 
Croatia was chosen as a key case study of EU pre-accession politics, potentially showing a different 
path of conditionality, transition and national adaptation than the experience of the EU10. The 
country applied for EU membership in 2003, was accepted as a candidate country in 2004, and was 
in negotiations with the EU until December 2011 when the accession treaty was signed.  
The institutional preparations for accession were supported with pre-accession aid through the 
CARDS, Phare, ISPA, SAPARD and IPA instruments. CARDS was formed as the financial arm of the 
Stabilisation and Association process in the Western Balkans. CARDS programming in Croatia 
covered the years 2001-2004 with an annual average budget of  ?65 million, and its implementation 
lasted until the end of 2009. CARDS was succeeded by Phare (averaging ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ?75 million p.a. in 
Croatia) and ISPA, a precursor to the Cohesion Fund ( ?30 million p.a.) after Croatia's move to pre-
accession for the 2005-2006 programming years, and by the agricultural instrument SAPARD for 
2006 ( ?25 million). Lastly, for the programming period 2007-13 an explicit pre-accession instrument, 
IPA, provided an annual average of  ?150 million (European Court of Auditors 2011).  
The primary source of data for the study comprised 31 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, 
administrators and experts undertaken in 2008-2009, nine of which are particularly relevant for this 
paper. Methodological triangulation was undertaken through process-tracing techniques for locating 
the key influence on the establishment of particular structures. In addition, the study involved 
assessment of an extensive body of policy, programme and project documentation relating to pre-
accession assistance in Croatia. Lastly, the findings from this case study were cross-compared with 
other contributions from the Croatian academic literature and included consideration of parallels 
with lessons learned from the EU10. 
 
Initial institutional conditions in Croatia 
The initial political-administrative conditions were not favourable for effective pre-accession 
assistance coordination in Croatia. In the early to mid-2000s, a weak performance in terms of inter-
ministerial coordination was stressed by assessment reports, the European Commission, academics 
and employees in the EU assistance field (European Commission 2004; 2005). Coordination of 
European issues was the responsibility of the Ministry of European Integration, initially created from 
the Government Office for European Integration in 2000, and subsumed into the Ministry of Foreign 
and European Affairs in 2005. Further, from 2004, every government ministry had a European 
Coordinator and many had established European coordination departments (European Commission 
2004). However, policy coordination suffered from the lack of an overarching body for policy 
supervision of planning, and decision-making tended to be politicised and fragmented (European 
Commission 2004). Coordination between ministries was insufficient, and the overall capacity at the 
centre of government regarding policy coordination was low (SIGMA 2007). This extended beyond 
central government: WƵůũŝǌ ĂŶĚ DĂůĞŬŽǀŝđ (2007) noted that there was no communication or 
coordination framework in place which would involve actors from central, regional and local level, 
despite strong coordination being stressed as important in preparing for EU Cohesion policy. These 
deficiencies were also recognised by officials. A job satisfaction survey among civil servants working 
in the EU assistance field confirmed that there was a need for better coordination and 
communication between institutions and their staff, including better external and internal 
coordination and clarification of responsibilities (East West Consulting 2006). 
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Consequently, improving coordination was a stated goal in the State Administration Reform Strategy 
2008-2011, among other measures, which were expected to enable the transition to the principles 
and practice of good governance in line with the best European standards (Central State Office for 
Administration 2008). The strategy also recognised the need to strengthen coordination of strategic 
planning to ensure better connection of plans drawn up by state administration bodies with the 
strategic objectives of the government. The Central Office for Development Strategy and 
Coordination of EU Funds (CODEF) was designated as the competent authority as part of its remit of 
managing and coordinating EU funds from the EU and other international donors, and strategy 
development. Furthermore, the Strategic Development Framework 2006-2013 emphasised the need 
to address to the problems of insufficient coordination capacity, which was hampering the efficiency 
of measures for regional development and inhibiting the formulation of an overall regional 
development policy (Government of the Republic of Croatia 2006b).  
The formal structures required to be set up for the coordination of pre-accession assistance 
comprised the National IPA Coordinator (NIPAC) and the Strategic Coordinator (SC). The IPA 
implementing regulation stipulated that the role of the NIPAC was to be executed by a high-ranking 
official in the government or state administration (EC 718/2007 Art.22). Its particular duties 
involved: first, ensuring partnership between the Commission and Croatia and a close link between 
the general accession process and the use of assistance under the IPA regulation (EC 718/2007 
Art.22). This close link was to be achieved through the programming of CARDS/PHARE/IPA I, notably 
the priorities identified in the accession process and ensuring transparent project selection 
procedures (Government of the Republic of Croatia 2009). Second, the NIPAC bore overall 
responsibility for coherence and coordination of the IPA programmes, the annual programming of 
the Transition Assistance and Institution Building component, the coordination of participation of 
Croatia in cross-border cooperation and transnational programmes. Third, the NIPAC was required 
to draw up and, after examination by the IPA monitoring committee, submit annual and final reports 
on implementation to the Commission as defined in Article 61 (3) with a copy to the national 
authorising officer (NAO) (EC 718/2007).  
In addition, the NIPAC (termed NAC under CARDS) was responsible for the preparation and 
coordination of the annual Financing Agreements in liaison with the NAO and the relevant ministries, 
and in agreement with the EC, to provide assistance to the NAO for the nomination of programme 
authorising officer in the Implementing Agency (CFCA). Furthermore, the NIPAC had responsibility 
for monitoring programme implementation, coordinating monitoring and evaluation activities and 
participating with the European Commission and NAO in the Joint Monitoring Committee 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia 2009).  
According to the IPA implementing regulation (EC 718/2007 Art. 23), Croatia was required to appoint 
a strategic coordinator to ensure coordination of the regional development component under the 
responsibility of the national IPA coordinator. This strategic coordinator had to be an entity within 
the state administration with no direct involvement in the implementation of programme 
components. The functions were to coordinate assistance, draft a strategic coherence framework 
and ensure coordination between sectoral strategies and programmes. The strategic coordinator for 
IPA III and IV was to follow the practice of a Structural Funds Coordination Authority ?ĂƐ ‘an interface 
with the Commission on strategic and regulatory matters, the management of horizontal matters 
(including horizontal Operational Programmes), and ensuring consistency of approach, high 
standards and synergies in both programming and implementation, for the benefit of both the 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂƌŝĞƐ ?(CARDS 2003 2007). The relevant NIPAC and strategic coordinator 
provisions of the IPA implementing regulation were incorporated in the framework agreement 
between the Commission and Croatia of 27 August 2007 (European Commission and Government of 
the Republic of Croatia 2007).  
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Establishment of new institutions 
The key question is how Croatia responded to the regulatory requirements for coordination, notably 
the operation of inter-ministerial coordination structures as exemplified by CODEF, and the roles of 
CARDS and IPA in building coordination structures. CODEF was established by government decree in 
May 2006 as a separate entity through the amalgamation of a directorate within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration and a government planning office responsible for national 
policy (Government Office for Strategic Development). CODEF undertook the overall coordination of 
EU Funds available to Croatia and its head, a state secretary, was the National Aid Co-ordinator 
under CARDS and PHARE and the National IPA Co-ordinator. The state secretary was appointed by 
the Government on the proposal of the prime minister, supported by two deputy secretaries and 
three heads of departments (CODEF 2009; Government of the Republic of Croatia 2006a). 
In addition, CODEF was responsible for preparing the development strategy of Croatia and 
monitoring the implementation of its objectives. In that respect, CODEF coordinated the 
development of the Strategic Coherence Framework, a basic IPA strategic document and precursor 
of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), which applied in the 2007-13 period, with 
respect to economic and social development. The role of Strategic Coordinator for IPA Components 
III and IV was undertaken by a Deputy State Secretary in CODEF. The department for EU programmes 
in the field of Economic and Social Cohesion was responsible for IPA components III and IV, with four 
sections for the respective OPs (CARDS 2003 2007). CODEF was responsible for preparing the NSRF. 
In doing so, it was expected to build on experience gained in preparing the Strategic Coherence 
Framework of IPA components III and IV, both in terms of processes and content (Government of 
the Republic of Croatia 2008). Although CODEF was expected to assume the role of the Coordinating 
Authority as soon as the Cohesion policy funds became available to Croatia, in 2012 it was absorbed 
by the Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds. 
CODEF was initially established during a Z^  ? ? ? ? ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ  “^ƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŽ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
WůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐ ‘ƌŽĂƚŝĂ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ
capacity, through the elaboration of the Strategic Coherence Framework and corresponding 
Operational Programmes, based on a wide consensus and in line with EU best practices and 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?(CARDS 2003 2007) ?tŝƚŚĂďƵĚŐĞƚŽĨ ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶ ?the project lasted from July 2005 to 
December 2007. It ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂƐŝƚƐĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂŶŶĞĚƌĞƐƵůƚ ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌ-ministerial coordination 
ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐŽǁŶƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĂƚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĨĂĐƚĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨK&
as a relevant achievement in its final report which referred to the decree establishing CODEF and 
related legislative acts assigning the coordination of EU programmes in Croatia to CODEF
2
.  
However, the institutional form of CODEF was also influenced by the domestic political aim of 
separating the management of EU funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration, which had shown little interest in financial assistance matters. This was justified with the 
argument of increasing flexibility (GOV2
3
), and was a domestic arrangement not requested by the EU 
(GOV1
4
, ECD3
5
). 
Rather than satisfying itself with setting up often hollow coordinative structures, pre-accession 
assistance performed the lengthy and laborious task of supporting nascent institutions, providing 
socialization fora and devising templates for coordination. The preparations for IPA implementation 
provided a testing ground for EU assistance as well as a source of adaptation pressure for the 
Croatian administration. The IPA Components III and IV served the aim of preparing Croatia as a 
candidate country for Cohesion policy (European Commission 2012b). Activities under Component III 
were grouped in three OPs corresponding to relevant sub-components (IIIa: Transport, IIIb: 
Environment and IIIc: Regional Competitiveness) while Component IV was served by a Human 
Resources Development OP. 
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Turning to horizontal coordination, the Croatian response to the challenge of systematic national 
partnership for development planning was provided, with the support of CARDS assistance, by 
CODEF, which convened: 
the Inter-ministerial Coordination Group, chaired by the State Secretary/NIPAC, comprising 
state secretaries of the key economic and social ministries and meeting twice monthly for 
the preparation of the SCF and approval of the OPs, and discussion of strategic issues 
concerning preparations for future SF; and Inter-ministerial working groups (IWGs) which 
have met as frequently as required for the elaboration of the OPs, for which CODEF 
provided both the chair and secretariat functions (CARDS 2003 2007). 
The CARDS 2003 Final Report noted that, although the coordination role covered the whole system, 
K& ?Ɛ ĐůŽƐĞƌ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ǁĞƌĞthe NAO and the National Fund. As 
regards contact with the operating structures for each OP, this would be predominantly with 
ministries taking the lead responsibility (Head of Operating Structure, HOS), which later evolved into 
managing authorities under the Structural Funds (CARDS 2003 2007). In this area, K& ?Ɛ
Department for EU Programmes in the Field of Economic and Social Cohesion undertook the 
coordinating task, with four sections overseeing the OPs under development. Additionally, the 
project assisted by providing matrices with proposed functions for institutions in IPA structures and 
played a facilitating role in the OP drafting process. While the inception report identified the need 
for enabling legislation for IPA management, this was not possible as the IPA implementing 
regulation had not entered into force (CARDS 2003 2007).  
CODEF established the IWGs in February 2006 with the task of drafting the IPA OPs and identifying a 
project pipeline for each of them (CARDS 2003 2007). The IWGs for the Regional Competitiveness OP 
(RCOP) and the Human Resources Development OP (HRDOP) proved to be a necessary mechanism 
for clarifying and making progress on strategy and project level. The preparation of the 
Environmental Protection OP and the Transport OP  were driven by a smaller number of institutions, 
therefore the relevant IWGs met less frequently. Attendance in the IWGs was at senior level, 
comprising the line ministries, the Central Bureau of Statistics and other state-funded agencies in the 
case of RCOP and HRDOP (CARDS 2003 2007). The IWGs remained an integral part of OP elaboration 
until the programmes were finalised. After approval of the OPs, the IWGs ďĞĐĂŵĞ  ‘the basis for 
^ĞĐƚŽƌĂůDŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐŽĨĞĂĐŚKW ?(CARDS 2003 2007). 
Pre-accession assistance through CARDS encouraged the establishment of the IWG and assisted in 
preparing the meeting agendas working closely with a Deputy State Secretary of CODEF. The CARDS 
2003 project team at CODEF attended meetings offering advice on technical issues, contributed to 
discussions, produced guidelines for IWG members on preparing OPs and explained the hierarchy of 
priorities, operations and projects and defined monitoring indicators (CARDS 2003 2007). Following 
the work of the IWGs, all the government structures for the management and implementation of IPA 
Components III and IV had been established and formalised with the approval of the four OPs, and 
they were accredited during 2008 (CARDS 2003 2007). The Operating Structure for IPA IIIc existed 
since mid-2007 but officially the contract was signed in March 2008, in the form of an operational 
agreement between the bodies responsible for IPA IIIc (GOV9
6
, GOV10
7
). 
In terms of the effectiveness of the structures, interview respondents recognised some 
ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞbetween 2002 and 
2008 led to the observation that by the end of ƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌ/W ? ‘ƐĞǀĞƌĂůůŝŶĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐŚĂǀĞƚŚ
role of operating structure therefore there is at least some formal assignment of coordination 
duties; inter-ministerial coordination structures exist albeit in a non-perfect form, but definitely 
ŵŽƌĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨǇĞĂƌƐ ?  ? ? ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌƚŚĞKƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĨŽƌ
IPA Component IIIc proved to be very challenging for coordination because of its complexity. The 
organisation chart of the RCOP management structure showed (a non-exhaustive) 49 forms of 
Volume 10, Issue 2 (2014) jcer.net Eleftherios Antonopoulos and John Bachtler 
 194 
relationship, some of them interrelationships (double arrows), but the research found that there 
were impediments to staff in the participating organisations speaking to each other on relevant 
issues without explicit authorisation.  
The OS and IWGs constituted a substantial part of the efforts for establishing effective coordination 
structures. As institutional coordination among the ministries improved, the contribution of pre-
accession assistance through inter-ministerial committees and working groups for document and 
programme preparation became recognised and appreciated (ACA 3). Lessons from CARDS and 
W,ZďĞŶĞĨŝƚĞĚƚŚĞǁĂǇ/WǁĂƐƌƵŶ P  ‘dĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞǁĂƐƉƵŵped into the 
ƌŽĂƚŝĂŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ?8). The NIPAC was organising meetings with representatives 
from different IPA components which gave the impression that each institution in charge of each IPA 
component had a clear view of the roles of other institutions in the system (ACA3). 
An important question was whether these structures would prove to be durable. The post-accession 
sustainability of the coordination structures (IWG and national partnership) was identified as an 
issue of concern early on in the pre-accession phase (European Commission 2005). There were 
differences in levels of confidence that the new approach to coordination in the form of the IWGs 
would stand the test of time for Structural Funds programming (ECD2; ACA3; CARDS 2003 2007). In 
particular, the effectiveness of the coordination structure relied on the interdependence of IPA 
bodies and  W importantly - collaboration and mutual learning under central guidance and 
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĞ  “ƋƵĂĚƌƵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ĨŽr bodies fulfilling similar roles in 
different OPs (CARDS 2003 2007). 
 
Domestic reaction 
Moving beyond the detailed institutional arrangements and operational experiences, the third area 
for investigation is the domestic reaction to EU influence on coordination structures and whether 
they were able to address or overcome long-standing cultural weaknesses permeating the Croatian 
public administration, which had constituted a barrier to effective and sustainable coordination. The 
broad consensus of interview respondents  W within and outside the public administration - is that 
pre-accession assistance led to an improvement of previously weak or non-existent coordination 
structures. Of particular importance was the role of CODEF in softer forms of coordination, for 
example working through different fora and informal mechanisms to coordinate the activities of 
different ministries, and engaging with ministers (GOV9, GOV10) to increase their appreciation of 
the importance of coordination (CON6
9
, ACA3).  
The extent of coordination was, however, limited. CODEF focused primarily on the bodies involved in 
managing and delivering the IPA components; other institutions involved in regional development 
but not participating in the IPA had much less awareness or involvement in the coordination 
structures (ACA3). More generally, further revision of coordination structures was considered 
necessary in terms of horizontal coordination, and stressed by Croatian officials (ECD2). 
Interdepartmental coordination remained problematic. With the exception of the top government 
level, where regular meetings were taking place, coordination was said to be less effective between 
the departments in the ministries. In particular, the funding ministries lacked an informed overview 
of the activities of their departments working on EU programmes. It was reported that departments 
in different ministries were ignorant about the strategies, Technical Assistance projects and actions 
that other departments were implementing. 
Although it was successful in establishing the required structures, CODEF fell short of executing its 
coordinating mission. Some respondents were not convinced that close coordination has been 
achieved. A perceived cause was that CODEF was outside the cabinet hierarchy and lacked the 
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political power to influence and monitor the performance of individual ministries (ECD3, ECD4
10
). 
K& ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ and influence were also felt to have diminished over time. For example, the 
coordination groups became  ‘rather a formality at times and they met occasionally to fulfil nominal 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ?Indeed, one external observer claimed that the influence of CODEF as a state 
actor in charge of strategy and coordination was progressively marginalised (CON6). This was due to 
the role of the prime minister at the time and a hostile culture towards independent initiative from 
other state bodies. This coincided with a change in the state secretary of CODEF, who while 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚ ?  ‘ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ Ă ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? dŚis led to CODEF 
 ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐ ?exacerbated by the unwillingness or 
inability of the European Commission Delegation to exercise a stronger role in coordinating the 
assistance.  
The fieldwork interviews are supported by evidence from other academic studies regarding the 
fragmented influence of CODEF on the development and coordination process. In their discussion of 
the causes of domestic change in Croatia, ĂĐŚĞĂŶĚdŽŵƓŝđ (2010) cite the accession process and 
direct and indirect effects of the acquis rather than pre-accession instruments and of the 
instrumental role of national ministries for gatekeeping and developing new structures. This view is 
corroborated by interviewees who criticised the mix of CO& ?Ɛ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? K& ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚĞ
ƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WƌŝŵĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŚŝĞĨ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ŽĨ
macroeconomic matters, and the compatibility ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚĂƐŬƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ KĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵŝŶŐ ƌŽůĞ
was considered a matter for concern (ECD3). While CODEF officials argued that the organisation 
constituted a major step towards the effective and efficient coordination of assistance and a strong 
indication that the Croatian government was determined to fulfil its obligations under Chapter 22 of 
the acquis (GOV2), European Commission Delegation  officials and consultants voiced concerns 
ĂďŽƵƚ K& ?Ɛ ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞƌ-
institutional power in the Croatian public administration especially as it did not constitute a cabinet 
ministry (CON6, ECD3, ECD4).  
This draws attention to cultural aspects of administrative change and the embeddedness of the 
reforms undertaken. An inhibiting factor for administrative capacity-building in Croatia was the 
exŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƉĂƌĂůůĞů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? /ƚ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ĨŽƌ Ă
single system for the management of funds, the Croatian authorities have created a structure for EU 
purposes while national funds including investment on regional development are channelled 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞ ‘ĂƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨĚƵďŝŽƵƐƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĐƌŽŶǇŝƐŵĂŶĚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? (ECD111). 
The academic literature partially confirms the fieldwork findings. ĂĐŚĞ ĂŶĚ dŽŵƓŝđ (2010) reveal 
some of the institutional weaknessess of CODEF, but they seemingly put the blame on the institution 
ŝƚƐĞůĨ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶĐĂƵƐĂůĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐŽƌĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚK&ƵŶĚĞƌ a 
particular organisational design. Also, their ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
incentives and the enthusiasm to complete accession led to a transformation in domestic policies 
ĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚŽĨ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?does not appear to be fully supported by their 
own evidence which points to a more superficial change. They present their results as thin learning 
and Type II MLG but do not link these claims with developments in particular organisations. In the 
subsequent periŽĚƵŶƚŝůƌŽĂƚŝĂ ?ƐhĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞĚĂŶĚǁĞƌĞŝŶŚĞƌŝƚĞĚďǇ
the Cohesion policy management structures. As a recent social network analysis of Cohesion policy 
in Croatia concluded: the network raises serious issues of coordination and coherence due to its 
dense pattern (Geddes, Lees, and Taylor 2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
Broadening the case studies of pre-accession Europeanization can only enrich European studies. This 
article has examined the critical case of pre-accession Croatia, the newest EU Member State with a 
more turbulent transition path than the EU10. The focus was on EU pre-accession assistance 
provision and conditionality and its effects on national coordination structures, which were 
mediated by domestic factors. Inter-institutional coordination was discussed here in three ways: as a 
first step by reference to the formal structures required by pre-accession assistance and the parallel 
domestic processes; secondly, by examining the role ascribed to CODEF; and thirdly, through a closer 
investigation of the extent of pre-accession assistance interventions and their influence on national 
coordination mechanisms.  
Pre-accession assistance was seen as the main driver for inter-institutional coordination in Croatia. 
Respondents recognised the formal coordinating role of inter-ministerial committees and working 
groups established through the CARDS and IPA instruments as well as informal effects and wider 
awareness stemming from the participation of public officials in activities such as training sessions. 
These provided a window of opportunity for the establishment of informal contacts between 
administrators who operated in a system of governance which, especially at the central government 
level, was characterised by a centralised and fragmented approach to policy-making. Traditionally in 
Croatia public bodies had operated in isolation from other state institutions and civil society; this 
was maintained, to a certain extent, because ministries strove to preserve any information 
advantage, reduce the dissemination of information to  ‘competing ? public institutions, and secure 
resource allocation favourable to the power base of senior officials and their political organisations 
through strict gatekeeping. 
This paper has found a mainly positive CARDS and IPA influence on administrative capacities for 
coordination, but negative and neutral influences were also observed. The positive influence was the 
creation of IPA management structures, and the establishment of inter-ministerial and inter-
institutional coordination arrangements. The direct influence of EU pre-accession assistance on 
structures was also clearly visible in the establishment of operating structures for IPA management. 
Of the eight managing authorities established to prepare for the future management of the 
Structural Funds, five were expected to evolve from similar institutions established for IPA. Likewise, 
the NAO, CAO, NIPAC, the Strategic Co-ordinator, the Audit Authority, the National Fund (Paying 
Authority) and many implementing agencies were examples of institutions which were expected to 
continue into the post-accession Cohesion policy management system.  
In most cases, some sense of ownership and benefit from coordination was instilled by pre-accession 
assistance. However, at times, EU Technical Assistance was substituting for non-existent domestic 
coordination. Effective coordination was hampered because of different priorities and budgetary 
constraints in ministries and departments. The engagement of public officials in coordination also 
depended on their individual workloads and the degree to which they had other duties apart from 
EU funding.  
On the negative side, ƚŚĞ ƌŽĂƚŝĂŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞƌ-
ministerial coordination arrangements must be characterised as inadequate, reinforcing the 
conclusions of other students, practitioners and state officials. At the outset, the EU emphasised that 
inter-ministerial coordination is of critical importance for effective implementation of pre-accession 
assistance and Structural Funds programmes. Improving inter-ministerial coordination was also a 
national strategic goal. Most important in achieving the goal was the coordinating function of CODEF 
and the provision of pre-accession assistance to strengthen it. In formal terms, the CARDS 2003 
project achieved its planned results by contributing to the establishment of CODEF as a co-ordinating 
body and the setting-up of the Inter-ministerial Coordination Group for the preparation of the 
Strategic Coherence Framework and the approval of IPA OPs and the Inter-ministerial Working 
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Groups which developed the OPs. However, the effectiveness of CODEF declined over time, and its 
influence on other government institutions was often weak, with implications for the durability of 
structures and ability to coordinate post-accession Cohesion policy. 
The examination of lessons learned from the EU10 reveals that the path of Croatian structures differ 
from many Central and Eastern European countries, notably Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Hungary (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007; Zubek 2008). There are more similarities with 
countries like Bulgaria and Romania, as regards the instability and incomplete state of structures, 
and the preferred type of institutional structures to receive financial assistance. As in Croatia, the 
approach most commonly followed was to establish EU-funds-related directorates in government 
ministries, but with several reorganisations and exchanges of competences between ministries, and 
the directorates moving between them. In Croatia, the Ministry of European Integration did not 
want responsibility for EU funds, leading to the coordination of EU funding being separated from the 
MEI and established as an institution responsible for the coordination of assistance outside the 
cabinet system. This extraordinary institutional location meant that results in terms of capacity-
building remained limited, and that continuity of structures was always a concern. Other studies on 
foreign aid to SEE have found that legislative fervour, constant restructuring and bureaucratic 
expansion of ministries (Bartlett 2008) constituted attempts to thwart or limit the spread and 
influence of EU standards in state institutions.  
With respect to the literature on Europeanisation and accession countries, this study highlights the 
importance of three domestic constraints, based on the Croatia case: the limited synergies between 
EU and national policies and value-added; considerations of political cost; and allocation of 
responsibilities. Two of the most vital institutions for the coordination and financing of pre-accession 
assistance, CODEF and the CFCA, had a separate mandate from government ministries or institutions 
responsible for macro-economic policy and public finances. CODEF was answerable to the prime 
minister and was not represented in the cabinet in its own right, as it lacked the status of a ministry. 
In a centralised system of governance, this meant that the role of CODEF was one of limited 
institutional gravity and influence. The Croatian PM was effectively a gatekeeper in terms of the 
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨK& ?ƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŽƌƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ. CODEF did not have sufficient political or 
policy influence to ensure effective coordination across government ministries and agencies, in 
particular to overcome entrenched institutional resistance and traditional ways of working among 
officials that did not encourage information-sharing or cooperation. As such, the research supports 
findings for other Central and Eastern European countries relating to the importance of political and 
administrative opportunity structures in explaining variation in coordination (Gärtner et al. 2011), 
but it also substantiates the arguments of ŝŵŝƚƌŽǀĂ ĂŶĚ dŽƐŚŬŽǀ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĂƚ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
and domestic politics are key factors influencing patterns and processes of institutional change. 
Finally, there are two sets of policy implications that emerge from the research. First, EU institutions 
and pre-accession policy instruments need to have stronger leverage in establishing coordination 
structures and ensuring the cultural embeddedness of processes. These are prerequisites for 
achieving synergies with other EU and national policies and securing added value for Cohesion 
policy, not least given the higher priority given to institutional coordination, policy coherence and 
integration of funding under the European Structural and Investment Funds for 2014-20. Second, in 
centralised states such as Croatia the role of the centre of government is essential for effective and 
efficient coordination of EU funding, and the key challenge is for the core executive to orchestrate 
the integration of the coordination process of EU funding into national decision-making structures. 
However, this needs to be accompanied by administrative capacity-building measures addressing 
systems, human resources and tools to ensure that the staff of ministries, agencies and other bodies 
are receptive to both the formal obligations and informal practices required for effective 
coordination. 
*** 
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1
Except the EU funds-related committees and coordination groups established at the domestic level, Croatia as an acceding 
country participated as an observer in the committees and expert groups of the Commission, namely the IPA Committee in 
DG Enlargement and the COCOF in DG Regio. Formal coordination mechanisms for pre-accession assistance comprise 
committees and expert groups. CARDS and PHARE committees operated in DG Enlargement in the context of relevant 
funding instruments (European Commission 2012a: 11-12). In the 2007-2013 programming period the IPA Committee 
operated in DG Enlargement; it was chaired by a Commission representative and consisted of representatives of the 
Member States and the Candidate Countries. The committee was responsible for the overall coordination of IPA 
components and especially the adoption of the Multi-annual Indicative Planning Documents  (MIPDs) and Annual reviews 
with regard to IPA component one and two (Transition Assistance and Institution Building, and Cross Border Cooperation) 
(Article 14 of Regulation 1085/2006). However the Committee of the Coordination of the Funds (COCOF) in the DG Regio 
performed a coordinating role with regard to the third and fourth IPA component (Regional Development and Human 
Resources Development respectively). Finally, the Rural Development Committee was the forum where the IPARD 
programmes were presented and discussed (European Commission 2013). However there were no formal mechanisms 
coordinating the work of COCOF with the other Committees, a situation that found parallels in the lack of formal links 
between COCOF and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development/European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
(EAFRD/EAGF) and European Fisheries Fund (EFF) committee (Davies 2011). 
2
 The Decree on Internal Organisation of CODEF was adopted on May 25 2006 Gazette no. 59/06. Coordination of EU 
programmes in Croatia assigned to CODEF through the Act of Organisation and Scope of Central State Administrative 
Authorities (Official Gazette no. 199/2003, 30/2004, 136/2004, 22/2005 and 44/2006) and the State Administration System 
Act (Official Gazette no. 75/93, 92/96, 48/99, 15/2000, 127/2000, 59/2001 and 199/2003). 
3
 Interviewee GOV2: National official involved in EU Funds coordination, Zagreb. 
4
 Interviewee GOV1: National official involved in EU Funds coordination, Zagreb. 
5
 Interviewee ECD3: European Commission official, Zagreb. 
6
 Interviewee GOV9: National ministry official involved in EU funding, Zagreb 
7
 Interviewee GOV10: National ministry official involved in EU funding, Zagreb 
8
 Interviewee ACA3: University researcher, Zagreb. 
9
 Interviewee CON6: Consultant on economic development, Zagreb. 
10
 Interviewee ECD4: European Commission official, Zagreb. 
11
 Interviewee ECD1: Consultant, former European Commission official, Belgrade. 
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